Maria Dubovikova engagement report
@politblogme - 75K followers on X
Measured over 12 original posts from a 30-day window, last computed on September 12, 2026.
Engagement
A typical post picks up 114 interactions against 75K followers, an engagement rate of 0.155%. Measured over 12 original posts, its engagement rate beats 56% of 20,183 tracked accounts of a similar size, which puts it in the middle of its size range rather than at either end. Posts are seen about 4.2K times each, and 2.69% of those impressions turn into an interaction. That is about 5.68% of the follower count, which is the gap between an audience on paper and an audience in a timeline. Posting runs at about 1.7 posts a day over the last 30 days, though only 27% of days saw any activity at all. Most posts go out around 09:00 UTC, and Sunday is the busiest day of the week. Of the 12 posts sampled, 67% carry an image or video and 8% link out. The account's strongest tracked post pulled 4.8K interactions, about 42x its own typical post.
Measured over 12 original posts from a 30-day window, last computed on September 12, 2026.
Compared with accounts its own size
Maria Dubovikova's engagement rate beats 56% of the tracked X accounts closest to it in follower count (20,183 accounts, accounts of similar size (decile 6 of 10)). A percentile is spread evenly by construction, so 50 really is the middle of that group and 90 really is its top tenth.
On engagement per impression rather than per follower it beats 69% of the same group. When those two numbers disagree, the gap is about how far its posts travel rather than how people react to them.
Where this sits in the catalog
At 0.155%, Maria Dubovikova sits above the 50th percentile of the 202,076 accounts in this comparison. That places it in the above the median band, which runs 0.142% to 0.672%.
Show the percentile table
| Percentile | Engagement rate |
|---|---|
| 10th percentile | 0.004% |
| 25th percentile | 0.024% |
| 50th percentile | 0.142% |
| 75th percentile | 0.672% |
| 90th percentile | 2.54% |
| 99th percentile | 82.5% |
This ruler is the whole measured catalog, not a size-matched group: it shows where the raw rate falls across every account we can measure, all of which are large. For a like-for-like comparison, read the size-band percentile above instead. See how the bands are built
Posting timing
This account posts most often around 09:00 UTC, and Sunday is its busiest day of the week. The bars below are the catalog-wide pattern, with this account's own busiest slot marked. They do not show how this account performs at each hour: we keep one aggregate per account, not one per hour, so that measurement does not exist in our data.
Show engagement by hour posted, utc as a table
| Hour (UTC) | Vs author median | Posts |
|---|---|---|
| 00:00 UTC | -1% | 89K |
| 01:00 UTC | -2% | 90K |
| 02:00 UTC | -3% | 88K |
| 03:00 UTC | -4% | 94K |
| 04:00 UTC | -5% | 76K |
| 05:00 UTC | -4% | 75K |
| 06:00 UTC | -5% | 86K |
| 07:00 UTC | -5% | 93K |
| 08:00 UTC | -4% | 108K |
| 09:00 UTC | -4% | 124K |
| 10:00 UTC | -3% | 129K |
| 11:00 UTC | -3% | 141K |
| 12:00 UTC | -3% | 154K |
| 13:00 UTC | -3% | 167K |
| 14:00 UTC | -4% | 173K |
| 15:00 UTC | -2% | 176K |
| 16:00 UTC | -3% | 171K |
| 17:00 UTC | -3% | 159K |
| 18:00 UTC | -2% | 149K |
| 19:00 UTC | -2% | 141K |
| 20:00 UTC | -1% | 131K |
| 21:00 UTC | 0% | 116K |
| 22:00 UTC | -2% | 100K |
| 23:00 UTC | -1% | 90K |
Show engagement by day of week as a table
| Day | Vs author median | Posts |
|---|---|---|
| Sunday | +5% | 393K |
| Monday | +1% | 483K |
| Tuesday | -2% | 520K |
| Wednesday | -3% | 472K |
| Thursday | -2% | 430K |
| Friday | -3% | 447K |
| Saturday | +2% | 393K |
Formats this account uses
Its own posting mix on the left, and what each of those formats does across every account we track on the right. Only formats where the effect clears our publish test appear here, so an empty row is a format we could not measure rather than one that does nothing.
| Format | This account | Catalog effect | 95% interval | Accounts behind it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Image or video | 67% of posts | +111% | +108% to +115% | 34K |
| Outbound link | 8% of posts | -41% | -42% to -40% | 32K |
| Typical length | - | +15% | +14% to +16% | 32K |
- 67% of this account's sampled posts carry an image or video. Across the catalog, posts with an image or video run 111% above the same accounts' other posts.
- 8% of its posts carry a link off X. Across the catalog, posts with an outbound link run 41% below the same accounts' other posts.
- Its average post runs 717 characters, which falls in the over 280 characters band. Across the catalog, posts over 280 characters run 15% above the same accounts' other posts.
These are catalog-wide differences applied to this account's own posting mix, not a measurement of how each format performs for this account specifically. We keep one median per account, not one per format per account, so the second thing is not something this data can tell you.
Best tweets
- Sep 4, 202642x their median
LEIPZIG Ist euch diese Manipulation nicht aufgefallen. JETZT meldet sich Krone-Schmalz zu Wort! https://t.co/5XFBBdKVz4
- Apr 8, 202227x their median
“A lie gets halfway around the world before the truth puts on its boots”. — Winston Churchill (as quoted by Ernest Lefever)
- Sep 6, 202624x their median
🇩🇪 German Chancellor Merz on AfD: "We will not let these people, who trash the Federal Republic of Germany and everything we have achieved in recent years and decades, despite all the mistakes that exist, despite all the problems we have. We will not let these people talk our country into ruin." It would be a cute speech if what was "achieved" in the last few decades wasn't the decline of Germany in just about every conceivable way. Writer: Mhedi https://t.co/Y7Y1tVtiK0
- Sep 5, 202613x their median
First the CIA director flies in. He makes threats. He’s told, in so many words, to go fuck himself. Next comes a show of escalation — during which the United States sits quietly in the shadows and gives its European marionettes room to throw a fit, those same marionettes who still sincerely believe they are sovereign. After that, the familiar negotiators arrive. The West operates by the models of social psychology — universal only in part, because everything they rest on was researched in the West, on Western subjects — and assumes Russia is not all that different and will react according to the patterns and rules they have identified. With an individual, especially a young one driven into a corner, that might work. With grown people here, with Russian tempering, and still more with a state system made of such people, it does not. Meanwhile, coercive diplomacy is unfolding in plain sight. Good cop, bad cop. The bad cop has already been here. Now two nice guys — the ones the chebureks in Zaryadye have been waiting for — have landed in Moscow. The scheme, the hard-power version of the door-in-the-face technique, looks like this in its pure form: Threat + unacceptable terms → refusal → escalation → negotiators (creating the illusion of an “exit” from a supposedly hopeless situation). Against the backdrop of pressure already applied, the deal is meant, in the manipulators’ design, to look like their concession and our salvation — not like capitulation from a standing start. And each round, run in cycles, makes that “exit” narrower and more inconvenient. The key nuance without which the scheme fails: it is not enough for the one making threats to frighten you. He also has to offer a credible guarantee that, if you agree, the pressure will stop and there will be an “honest peace.” Will the current visit produce any diplomatic movement? Of course not. Talking to Russia from a position of strength is useless. What does a Russian do when the other side starts acting the bull? Either he tries to get rid of the nuisance — or he hits him in the face. Even if the West wanted to talk differently, it no longer has that option. Today’s militarism and hysteria have cut it off: if it starts that game now, its rabid hangers-on will accuse the ruling elites of betrayal, defeatism, and whatever other sins are known only to them. The West’s bet on intimidation only kills any desire to talk at all, to hear anything coming from that direction, let alone to listen. There is little point to what is happening beyond giving Ukraine a few days to regroup during the white gentlemen’s tour, so it can continue state terrorism — “raising the stakes to force peace,” as Kiev’s handlers like to put it.
- Sep 5, 20261.8x their median
What a perfect example of mirror propaganda. This technique is also known as “accusation in a mirror.” The method is simple: you attribute to your opponent in advance exactly what you yourself intend to do (in this case, the West attributes to Russia — and personally to Putin (personalisation here is manipulation as well) — an escalation that it has itself planned and is preparing to carry out). Your own action then appears as a “forced response” or “preemptive self-defense,” while public opinion is already primed: “We didn’t start it; he did — driven into a corner, he struck first.” “Driven into a corner” is itself a manipulation either, by the way. The West needs to prove that the Russian bear is finished; otherwise it cannot compel its target audience to keep patiently enduring hardship and supporting the financing of the war. The narrative is that Russia is supposedly desperate and will therefore inevitably strike — which makes striking it now both normal and necessary. The French psychosociologist Roger Mucchielli wrote in Psychologie de la publicité et de la propagande (1970) that a propagandist must always demonstrate the purity of his own intentions, and to that end he accuses the adversary — that is, he ascribes to his enemies precisely what he himself plans to do. Jacques Ellul described the same mechanism: those who are themselves preparing for war first accuse the other side of provocation. The West loves this technique. History offers countless examples. World War II began this way in 1939. The Great Patriotic War began this way in 1941. What will begin this time remains to be seen.
- Sep 7, 20261.5x their median
US Senator John Kennedy has called for Washington to “choke” Putin “to death” with tougher sanctions. “Vladimir Putin, this guy’s a pirate, he’s got blood under his fingernails… you don’t get any credit for kissing his ass, you’ve got to show him you mean business.” “We got Putin down. We’re choking him to death… That’s what he understands.” Kennedy seems to have a thing for strangulation fantasies. Last year, he told the Senate it was time to “put Putin on his knees. Get him down and choke him.”
- Sep 5, 2026
Kushner and Witkoff were taken to the Avrora restaurant in Moscow, the facade of which is decorated with the slogan “Everything for Victory.” https://t.co/CX6nHfGVYO
- Sep 6, 2026
All this hysteria over Russian Houses is nothing but a pre-election tantrum from an elitist caste that can feel the chairs under their asses shaking and falling apart. This is all about the fear of losing power, of being held to account by the opposition, and of investigations into Ukraine-linked corruption schemes. There is not a shred of truth in these orchestrated campaigns. It is an absolute lie the ruling elites are using to try to save their own asses.
- Sep 4, 2026
Strike on SBU building in Kyiv occurred amid conflict between the special service and GUR. The conflict erupted after the abduction of Stepan Kaplunov, deputy commander of the RDK, whom the SBU accused of ties to the FSB and of preparing an assassination. GUR called the detention illegal and stated that pressure was being applied to its employees. Later a shootout involving security forces took place in Kyiv; a GUR employee was killed and two others were wounded. Local media noted that one of the possible reasons for the shooting could have been a struggle over influence on fraudulent call centers rather than the detention of the mercenary. Against this backdrop a drone struck the central SBU building in Kyiv. Zelensky immediately blamed Russia and said the UAV had been directed at the office of the service’s head, after which he promised a “mirror response.” Video published before the explosion shows a black drone flying into the building. Since the start of the SMO, high-ranking Ukrainian officials and heads of security agencies have been transferred to “bunker support.” Seven people are reported injured, but it is unknown whether any of them are agency employees. GUR has repeatedly staged similar provocations in European countries. UAV airframes were reworked and fitted with new “brains,” then launched toward EU countries so that the incidents could be presented as alleged Russian attacks and used to accuse Moscow. Such episodes occurred in Moldova, Poland, and the Baltic states. It is also noteworthy that, contrary to the official ban, Ukrainian public channels openly posted footage from the strike site, while Zelensky almost immediately provided specific details about the “hit.” In addition, according to monitoring resources, no air-raid alert was declared in Kyiv at the moment of the strike, and no other Gerans were recorded in the region’s airspace. Usually, when the Russian Armed Forces strike, they attack Ukraine with a “swarm.” Thus it cannot be ruled out that what happened was another provocation originating from Bankova. Kiev and its Western puppeteers rise the stakes. They have very little time left. They want total war.
- Sep 4, 2026
Dreckige Nazis @jurgen_nauditt https://t.co/NWtEB3vDMV
Ranked by total interactions across everything we have tracked for this account, which is a longer history than the 30-day window the rates above use. The multiple compares each post to this account's own median.
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Reading these numbers
A typical post picks up 114 interactions against 75K followers, an engagement rate of 0.155%. Measured over 12 original posts, its engagement rate beats 56% of 20,183 tracked accounts of a similar size, which puts it in the middle of its size range rather than at either end. Posts are seen about 4.2K times each, and 2.69% of those impressions turn into an interaction. That is about 5.68% of the follower count, which is the gap between an audience on paper and an audience in a timeline. Posting runs at about 1.7 posts a day over the last 30 days, though only 27% of days saw any activity at all. Most posts go out around 09:00 UTC, and Sunday is the busiest day of the week. Of the 12 posts sampled, 67% carry an image or video and 8% link out. The account's strongest tracked post pulled 4.8K interactions, about 42x its own typical post.
- What is Maria Dubovikova's engagement rate on X?
- Maria Dubovikova (@politblogme) has an engagement rate of 0.155%, based on the median interactions across 12 original posts from the last 30 days against 74,720 followers. Replies, reposts and quote-posts of other people are excluded from that sample.
- Is that a good engagement rate?
- At 0.155%, Maria Dubovikova sits above the 50th percentile of the 202,076 accounts in this comparison. Those comparison accounts are all large ones, because our scanning cadence is weighted towards big accounts, so this is a ranking among peers of similar scale rather than a ranking across X.
- Does @politblogme have real engagement?
- Its engagement rate beats 56% of the tracked X accounts closest to it in follower count (20,183 accounts), which puts it in the middle of its size range group. Ranking inside a size band matters because engagement rate falls as accounts grow, so a raw rate would mostly re-measure the follower count. It is a starting point for a look at follower quality, not a verdict on it.
- When does @politblogme post?
- Most posts go out around 09:00 UTC, and Sunday is its busiest day, at roughly 1.67 posts per day across the measured window.