Institute for the Study of War engagement report

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• Sep 16, 20266.8x their median

  NEW | SPECIAL REPORT: The Kremlin is conducting a coordinated series of kinetic campaigns targeting Europe, and NATO states must understand and forthrightly discuss both these ongoing Russian campaigns against Europe and the evolving character of the near-term Russian conventional threat.  The Russian government has long considered itself to be in a long-term conflict with the West — a conflict it has recently escalated through a coordinated series of kinetic campaigns against European targets beyond Ukraine.  European states must both understand internally and publicly name these campaigns for what they are: coordinated kinetic and non-kinetic attacks against NATO military and civilian targets, not isolated incidents or “provocations.” European officials’ increased willingness to publicly discuss Russia’s kinetic campaigns is positive, but much of the language NATO and individual European states use to discuss the ongoing Russian campaigns still obfuscates the coordinated and coherent nature of the Russian efforts. NATO must additionally prepare for the possibility of near-term conventional Russian attacks that would not be militarily existential to NATO but could be politically existential by dividing NATO, and on a timeline faster than those that many European officials currently orient themselves on. NATO and European states require a shared understanding of the problem to design and execute coordinated policies to defeat ongoing Russian kinetic campaigns and deter the Russian conventional threat. NATO and European states have three overall tasks. First, NATO and Europe must understand and respond to the ongoing Russian kinetic campaigns against Europe, and must use clear language when communicating about Russian actions to facilitate prompt and meaningful responses. Second, NATO and Europe must rapidly accelerate efforts to forecast and prepare for the risk of a potential near-term limited Russian conventional attack that NATO is not yet sufficiently taking into account Third, NATO and Europe must improve ongoing efforts to leverage lessons from Ukraine and forecasts of the changing character of war and strengthen NATO’s ability to deter or defeat the evolving conventional Russian military threat. These three challenges are interlinked and must be taken as a whole. Open, clear-eyed, and prompt discussion of potential European policy responses are essential to respond to the ongoing Russian threat and the risk of further Russian actions to test or directly attack NATO. (1/2)

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• Oct 7, 20266.7x their median

  Ukraine Claws Back Land in the Donbas, Thwarting a Russian Push - via @NYTimes using control of terrain data from @TheStudyofWar Link ⬇️ https://t.co/Kcn0dN2wSd

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• Jul 30, 20266.2x their median

  A missing Ukrainian child listed in the national Children of War registry has been identified as a soldier in the Russian army. According to the Back to Ukraine team, Oleksandr Mustiatse from the Kherson region — officially recorded as missing since Russia's occupation — appeared on social media wearing a Russian military uniform marked with the "Z" symbol, posing with the Russian flag and sharing photos from positions where he was fighting against Ukraine. Many people may see this as an individual choice, but I see something very different. This case demonstrates the long-term consequences of leaving Ukrainian children under Russian occupation. At Save Ukraine, we speak with children and families who have escaped occupied territories almost every day. Their stories reveal a systematic process that begins long before military service. Children are introduced to militarized education in kindergarten and school, encouraged to join Yunarmiya, taught to handle weapons, and repeatedly told that Ukraine is their enemy while military service to Russia is their duty. When this becomes the only reality a child knows for years, propaganda stops feeling like propaganda. It becomes identity. This is why time under occupation is one of the greatest threats facing Ukrainian children today. Russia is not simply occupying territory, but deliberately investing in reshaping an entire generation — erasing Ukrainian identity and preparing children to see service in the Russian military as a normal and honorable path. Every month a child remains under occupation makes this system harder to reverse. That is why rescuing children is about far more than bringing them to safety, but about protecting their identity, preserving their future, and preventing the weaponization of an entire generation. You can help make that possible. Please share this story to raise awareness about what Ukrainian children face under occupation. And if you are able, support Save Ukraine's rescue missions so we can bring more children and families home safely. Donate here: https://t.co/XMusgO4Oqb

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• Oct 23, 20265.4x their median

  SPECIAL REPORT: Russian military victory over Ukraine is not inevitable. It is extraordinarily unlikely, in fact, unless Western support for Ukraine collapses. There is simply no inevitable correlation between the relative size of combatants and the outcome of a war — particularly when the war is existential for the smaller state but not for the larger one, as is true today. Russian President Vladimir Putin is nevertheless trying once again to breathe life into the myth of inevitable Russian military victory in order to persuade the United States and other supporters of Ukraine to compel Kyiv to surrender. Ukraine, not Russia, has actually held the initiative in key sectors of the frontline for much of the year and has developed a number of ways of offsetting the overall Russian manpower advantage. Russia’s population and relative (but diminishing) wealth will let Putin continue his war for a long time, to be sure. But Ukraine can also continue fighting for its existence as long as Western support continues.

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• Sep 24, 20265.4x their median

  SPECIAL REPORT | NEW: Russia is operating within a war framework against Europe while Europe continues to function within a peace framework. A full-scale war between Russia and NATO is not inevitable or imminent, but NATO and European states must recognize the framework the Kremlin is using to conduct necessary efforts to deter Russian escalation. The Kremlin is conducting several mutually supporting campaigns against Europe in order to support its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and advance its longstanding grand strategic objectives of breaking NATO and reestablishing dominant influence over former Soviet states. ISW assesses that the Kremlin is conducting a series of overlapping campaigns to achieve at least two overarching strategic objectives: Reduce or eliminate European military and diplomatic support for Ukraine; and neutralize NATO as a unified alliance capable of opposing Russia. The Kremlin is also conducting three coordinated military campaigns in distinct operational theaters targeting the airspace and territory of NATO member states and Moldova that are extensions of Russia's war in Ukraine. The growing pace of Russian kinetic actions against Europe is intended to cause two effects: to raise NATO's threshold of what actions are considered worthy of a response, and to inure NATO governments and populations to constant alerts so that they do not take any individual Russian action seriously. The Kremlin also benefits, however, from European underreaction to the Kremlin's ongoing campaigns, and particularly from the analysts and public officials who reject any discussion of ongoing Russian kinetic campaigns against Europe or warnings of the near-term Russian threat out of hand. Finding a balance between necessary urgency and panic will be incredibly challenging in the face of both Russian information operations and good faith policy disagreements, but NATO and Europe must address this balance. The difficulty European governments face in acknowledging that Russia is operating within a war framework and pursuing actual military lines of effort against and within European states is proof of the success of Russian cognitive warfare efforts. European political parties and populations must understand the degree to which they have been conditioned by extensive Russian efforts to avoid calling Russian actions what they are — parts of a military campaign intended to achieve discrete effects. No one desires a war with Russia. The purpose of describing the Russian war framework and advocating for responses to it is to avoid escalation and conventional war. Europe (and the United States) must find a way to open their discourse to the idea that they must recognize the war framework.

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• Aug 28, 20265.1x their median

  NEW: US Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow suggests that Russia may be preparing to conduct an act of aggression against a NATO member in the relatively near term to invalidate NATO’s Article 5. A near-term Russian attack is highly unlikely to involve a full-scale conventional invasion of a NATO state. The nature of the Russian threat that the US is reportedly attempting to deter in 2026 is significantly different from the threat of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late 2021. The Kremlin continues to deflect Western concerns and deny any intention of conducting aggression against NATO, but these statements are part of a larger effort to create ambiguity and to degrade the alliance’s resolve to counter Russian threats. Baltic state officials and government-affiliated analysts emphasized that NATO should take the Russian threat seriously but that their immediate threat assessment has not changed. Russia may conduct air, missile, or drone strikes or a limited incursion against one or more Baltic states to test and seek to break NATO’s resolve to invoke and respond under Article 5. Several unidentified drones entered Moldovan airspace on the night of August 26 to 27, demonstrating that the Kremlin continues to accept the risk that Russia’s war against Ukraine can cause damage to other states, including Moldova and NATO states bordering Ukraine. Other Key Takeaways ⬇️

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• Oct 16, 20264.8x their median

  NEW: Ukrainian forces reportedly regained unrestricted access to Starshield on October 15, following in-motion speed restrictions on SpaceX’s Starshield communications network over Ukraine. Other Key Takeaways: High-ranking Kremlin officials continue to emphasize that there is and was no energy ceasefire agreement, rejecting any meaningful concept of a ceasefire proposal. Ukrainian forces struck six Russian Su-34M fighter-bombers at the Borisoglebsk Military Airfield in Voronezh Oblast overnight on October 14 to 15. Likely Russian drones struck four civilian vessels in the Black Sea, including two commercial tankers in Romanian territorial waters on October 14 and 15. Ukrainian forces likely struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast overnight on October 14 to 15. Russia launched two Kh-59 cruise missiles and 580 drones against Ukraine overnight on October 14 to 15 and 138 drones during the day on October 15. Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk and southwest of Orikhiv.

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• Sep 7, 20264.6x their median

  NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s unwillingness to make any meaningful compromises in the peace negotiations process to end the war in Ukraine. Putin is instead doubling down on the fictional battlefield situation that he defines as “reality” and insisting that his misrepresentation of the actual state of the war become the basis for any peace negotiations on Ukraine. Key Takeaways ⬇️ The lies and distortions of Russian military commanders at many levels are likely leading Putin to harden his perception that Russian forces can achieve his intended objectives in Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026 and thus that he need not make any compromises in his aims. Russia is failing to achieve its battlefield objectives in reality, however, and is specifically failing in its priority objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026. Russian forces will not seize Donetsk Oblast until 2032 at their current rate of advance — if they can seize it at all. ISW is not prepared to assess that Russian forces will be able to take the rest of Donetsk Oblast on any timeline, however. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner in Kyiv City on September 6 and agreed on fundamental principles for ending the war in Ukraine, including security and economic guarantees for post-war Ukraine. Putin’s demands transcend Donbas, as both his 2024 speech (to which Russian officials constantly allude) and Russia’s military operations demonstrate. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and the suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in Rostov Oblast on the night of September 5 to 6.

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• Oct 23, 20264.2x their median

  NEW: The Kremlin's seeming interest in negotiations aims not to end the war in Ukraine but rather to secure economic concessions from the United States such that Russia can continue funding its war. Other Key Takeaways: The Kremlin is fundamentally interested only in buying time to resolve the war on the battlefield while Russia simultaneously reaps the benefits of economic cooperation with the United States. Russian forces are not winning on the battlefield, however, particularly as Ukrainian forces have stymied the planned Russian offensive to seize Donetsk Oblast. The Kremlin is likely actively seeking economic cooperation with the United States as Russia faces significant financial strain. Russian forces conducted a massive missile and drone strike against Ukraine overnight on October 21 to 22 following the October 21 meeting between Witkoff and Putin- a continuation of Russia’s pattern of launching large strike packages in the days before and after major peace talks. Russian forces struck Kyiv City with cluster munitions to purposely harm the civilian population, likely as part of wider Russian efforts to distract from Ukraine’s recent battlefield successes and ultimately force Ukraine into capitulation by making daily life untenable. Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Vovchansk and in southern Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets on October 21 and overnight on October 21 to 22.

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• Sep 16, 20264.2x their median

  NEW: The Ukrainian military gave its first explicit confirmation of ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations against the Russian salient northwest of Lyman. The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps conducted an intermediate-range strike campaign to interdict Russian logistics and degrade fuel supplies as part of Operation Vivaldi. Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi has achieved the operationally-significant objective of disrupting the Russian effort to conduct a wide encirclement of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt. Other Key Takeaways: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky restated on September 15 Ukraine’s willingness to engage in a mutual ceasefire on energy targets with Russia amidst US President Donald Trump’s push for this ceasefire. The Kremlin continues to publicly and explicitly outline its continued commitment to its maximalist war aims in Ukraine and deflect from opportunities for de-escalation. The US Treasury Department announced on September 14 that it imposed additional sanctions against Russian state-majority owned bank VTB for its involvement in Iranian sanctions evasion and increasing Russian-Iranian bilateral trade. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction and the Fortress Belt Outer Encirclement Effort. Russian forces launched 200 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against oil, defense industrial, and military infrastructure in Russia.

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