Qalaat Al Mudiq engagement report
@QalaatAlMudiq - 83K followers on X
Measured over 30 original posts from a 30-day window, last computed on October 4, 2026.
Engagement
A typical post picks up 156 interactions against 83K followers, an engagement rate of 0.187%. Measured over 30 original posts, its engagement rate beats 63% of 26,733 tracked accounts of a similar size, which puts it in the middle of its size range rather than at either end. Posts are seen about 14K times each, and 1.10% of those impressions turn into an interaction. That is about 17.0% of the follower count, which is the gap between an audience on paper and an audience in a timeline. Posting runs at about 2.2 posts a day over the last 30 days, though only 40% of days saw any activity at all. Most posts go out around 18:00 UTC, and Monday is the busiest day of the week. Of the 30 posts sampled, 80% carry an image or video and 17% link out. The account's strongest tracked post pulled 1.6K interactions, about 10x its own typical post. Recurring topics include #syria, #isis, #damascus.
Measured over 30 original posts from a 30-day window, last computed on October 4, 2026. Recurring tags: #syria, #isis, #damascus.
Compared with accounts its own size
Qalaat Al Mudiq's engagement rate beats 63% of the tracked X accounts closest to it in follower count (26,733 accounts, accounts of similar size (decile 8 of 10)). A percentile is spread evenly by construction, so 50 really is the middle of that group and 90 really is its top tenth.
On engagement per impression rather than per follower it beats 42% of the same group. When those two numbers disagree, the gap is about how far its posts travel rather than how people react to them.
Where this sits in the catalog
At 0.187%, Qalaat Al Mudiq sits above the 50th percentile of the 268,300 accounts in this comparison. That places it in the above the median band, which runs 0.165% to 0.77%.
Show the percentile table
| Percentile | Engagement rate |
|---|---|
| 10th percentile | 0.004% |
| 25th percentile | 0.029% |
| 50th percentile | 0.165% |
| 75th percentile | 0.77% |
| 90th percentile | 2.84% |
| 99th percentile | 74.7% |
This ruler is the whole measured catalog, not a size-matched group: it shows where the raw rate falls across every account we can measure, all of which are large. For a like-for-like comparison, read the size-band percentile above instead. See how the bands are built
Posting timing
This account posts most often around 18:00 UTC, and Monday is its busiest day of the week. The bars below are the catalog-wide pattern, with this account's own busiest slot marked. They do not show how this account performs at each hour: we keep one aggregate per account, not one per hour, so that measurement does not exist in our data.
Show engagement by hour posted, utc as a table
| Hour (UTC) | Vs author median | Posts |
|---|---|---|
| 00:00 UTC | -1% | 89K |
| 01:00 UTC | -2% | 90K |
| 02:00 UTC | -3% | 88K |
| 03:00 UTC | -4% | 94K |
| 04:00 UTC | -5% | 76K |
| 05:00 UTC | -4% | 75K |
| 06:00 UTC | -5% | 86K |
| 07:00 UTC | -5% | 93K |
| 08:00 UTC | -4% | 108K |
| 09:00 UTC | -4% | 124K |
| 10:00 UTC | -3% | 129K |
| 11:00 UTC | -3% | 141K |
| 12:00 UTC | -3% | 154K |
| 13:00 UTC | -3% | 167K |
| 14:00 UTC | -4% | 173K |
| 15:00 UTC | -2% | 176K |
| 16:00 UTC | -3% | 171K |
| 17:00 UTC | -3% | 159K |
| 18:00 UTC | -2% | 149K |
| 19:00 UTC | -2% | 141K |
| 20:00 UTC | -1% | 131K |
| 21:00 UTC | 0% | 116K |
| 22:00 UTC | -2% | 100K |
| 23:00 UTC | -1% | 90K |
Show engagement by day of week as a table
| Day | Vs author median | Posts |
|---|---|---|
| Sunday | +5% | 393K |
| Monday | +1% | 483K |
| Tuesday | -2% | 520K |
| Wednesday | -3% | 472K |
| Thursday | -2% | 430K |
| Friday | -3% | 447K |
| Saturday | +2% | 393K |
Formats this account uses
Its own posting mix on the left, and what each of those formats does across every account we track on the right. Only formats where the effect clears our publish test appear here, so an empty row is a format we could not measure rather than one that does nothing.
| Format | This account | Catalog effect | 95% interval | Accounts behind it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Image or video | 80% of posts | +111% | +108% to +115% | 34K |
| Outbound link | 17% of posts | -41% | -42% to -40% | 32K |
| Typical length | - | +15% | +14% to +16% | 32K |
- 80% of this account's sampled posts carry an image or video. Across the catalog, posts with an image or video run 111% above the same accounts' other posts.
- 17% of its posts carry a link off X. Across the catalog, posts with an outbound link run 41% below the same accounts' other posts.
- Its average post runs 822 characters, which falls in the over 280 characters band. Across the catalog, posts over 280 characters run 15% above the same accounts' other posts.
These are catalog-wide differences applied to this account's own posting mix, not a measurement of how each format performs for this account specifically. We keep one median per account, not one per format per account, so the second thing is not something this data can tell you.
Best tweets
- Nov 27, 202410x their median
#Syria: facing uptick of pro-Regime attacks vs civilians in Greater #Idlib (15+ children killed & wounded yesterday in a school), Fateh Mubin Operation Room, gathering main Rebel groups, launched this morning "Deterrence of Aggression" op'. Focus is the W. #Aleppo countryside. https://t.co/KlVkC5cPD8
- Sep 27, 20264.2x their median
Nasrallah is gone - so are many of the men who helped wage Assad's war for him. On the 2nd anniversary of his killing in a bunker, remember the Hezbollah fighters - Radwan & others - who went to #Syria to keep Assad in power & showed no hesitation besieging & starving civilians from Damascus to Aleppo. A large amount of those fighters - & most of the senior cadres behind Hezbollah involvement - are now dead. Russian Generals, Officers & Pilots who provided Assad with unmatched firepower later died invading Ukraine. In Iran, many of the architects of the intervention in Syria & the #IRGC Axis occupation project - from Khamenei to top advisers & commanders - were also killed. In just a few years, a remarkable number of those who enabled mass killings, destruction in Syria & were implicated in war crimes themselves met their end. This comes along with the arrest of over 6,000 former Regime elements since Assad's fall & the first sentences issued. Justice can be slow & take unexpected forms - but reckoning comes, one way or another.
- Sep 28, 20263.1x their median
Former US Diplomat Aaron David Miller: Israel tried to get US sanctions lifted on Assad in his last days https://t.co/cpcpTS0Apm
- Sep 26, 20262.3x their median
#ISIS attacks decreased lately in #Syria - what does this mean? The decline is likely the result of the repeated blows dealt to IS past months, but the lull could also reflect a deliberate effort to keep a lower profile while preparing its next moves. This would be supported by the voluntary media blackout IS has imposed in the country since late June, something never seen before on this scale (previous similar blackouts were only limited to specific areas). Most attacks this year were concentrated in 4 provinces: Aleppo, Damascus, Raqqa & Deir Ezzor - with a surge in February-March. The map below show the rough locations of main attacks - a clear clustering of attacks is immediately apparent. In Aleppo & Deir Ezzor, the pattern was similar: Security & military personnel were the main targets, with direct shootings & IED attacks. Raqqa has seen bolder attacks, incl. assaults on Security checkpoints right in the city, with even one checkpoint attacked twice within 48 hours. But it's in Damascus where the most sensitive attacks in post-Assad era took place: after the attempted bombing of S. Zeinab shrine & the suicide attack in a Church in 2025, this year saw a failed car bomb attack at a "sensitive site", the killing of a Shiite cleric & a twin terror attack during Macron's visit. In the South, IS cells had a much lower activity & the recent busts in Daraa & Quneitra showed a common pattern: the cells collected funds for the group - from extortion to theft. Per official data, over 850 IS members were arrested since Assad's fall & dozens killed - among them some senior figures (overall military commander for Syria + his successor caught 7 months later & Governor for Palestine-Lebanon). This is a sharp contrast with IS insurgency between 2018 & 2024, when Regime combing ops in the desert rarely resulted in IS members being captured or killed - pro-Assad forces were regularly ambushed or fell into IED traps. The opportunity IS took just after Assad's fall, when it left the vast desert that is used as its stronghold & moved to urban centers, also exposed its fighters in new & unprecedented ways. The group seems to have believed that its members could blend into the population & operate more discreetly - that assumption proved costly. Counter-terrorism raids appear to have intensively relied on surveillance & Intelligence gathering, incl. tips provided by foreign services. CCTV footage & eyewitnesses became important in tracking & busting cells, in sharp contrast with the central desert where IS could operate with much more freedom. A decrease in activity, as witnessed since this Summer, doesn't mean IS is gone however. The group still has veterans in the country, appears to have little difficulty recruiting - with motivations ranging from poverty to radicalism - even if the pay can be in some cases as little as $100/month, potentially suggesting IS is struggling financially. It's also important to note most Security raids focused on busting active cells, with few pre-emptive ops: a quieter environment could give IS space to reorganize. IS has also shown its ability to adapt over the past decade, changing tactics when confronted with sustained pressure or an unfavorable security environment. For now, the lower tempo of attacks appears to reflect a more difficult operational environment following sustained losses, rather than the threat disappearing, & more broadly an IS re-calibration of its post-Assad strategy.
- Sep 29, 20262.1x their median
افتتاح خط الغاز العربي ومركز التدريب في مديرية حقول المنطقة الوسطى بحمص. #سانا https://t.co/RJofYjqbDy
- Oct 3, 20262.0x their median
What became of the Alawite insurgency that emerged from Assadist networks on the Syrian Coast? - from active insurgency to dormant cells. 2026 has so far confirmed the trend observed in the 2nd half of 2025: the steady decrease of attacks, followed by a complete lull during the last 9 months - the latest attempted attack was in January. This strategic deadlock comes from a simple fact: despite potentially being able to mobilize a large number of fighters (many are in Lebanon), the insurgents don't have a realistic way to seize & hold the Coastal Areas. Insurgent leaders certainly closely watched - and likely with consternation - the January Government Offensive vs #SDF, incl. its swift results in the highly fortified Sheikh Maqsoud district, a YPG stronghold. A Coastal insurgent group later acknowledged to have lost fighters there, while fighting Government forces. A sustained insurgency with regular attacks on the Coast could also expose the Alawite population to retaliatory attacks, potentially creating a vicious cycle of retaliations & counter-retaliations, while the Coastal Areas remained quiet - in contrast to more frequent attacks in provinces such as Homs or Hama. Security forces didn't remain idle either, but adapted their strategy: targeting the groups that remained active, while tracking those involved in the 6 March onslaught. Interestingly, the attacks carried out between August & October 2025 didn't come from the main insurgent group - the Coastal Shield Brigade - but from a smaller group called "Men of Light" (aka "Saraya Jawad"). The group appears to have specialized in IED attacks: 3 attacks were carried out in 2nd half of 2025 & one was thwarted in January, but none produced casualties. They justified 2 of these attacks as retaliations for Alawite civilians - incl. a female teacher - killed in Homs & Hama provinces. The group also appears to have been involved in the online leak of the passports of Syrian Officials who went to Lebanon in October 2025. Men of Light therefore attracted most of the Security attention this year. Latakia Security commander specifically linked those behind Men of Light's IED attacks in Latakia & Tartus to the July 25 operation that killed them, as well as to the January 24 operation that arrested members who carried out unspecified attacks. The group was also the first to be decapitated: its leader was killed in the February operation carried out in S. Latakia countryside, where the group appears to have its main base - all 3 cells busted were hiding in Beit Yashout countryside (see map). All these operations appear to have been based on precise Intelligence, often provided by residents. In the November 2025 operation targeting Azrael Regiment members in Baniyas countryside, the group openly complained about this reality, labeling it a "betrayal by the Alawite community". For instance, at least 2 Alawite residents from Salhab (W. Hama) were executed by Alawite anti-Government insurgents in September & October 2025 - the cell was busted in July. For its part, the Coastal Shield Brigade, considered the largest group & notably involved in the 6 March 2025 onslaught, didn't carry out attacks in one year. Most of its members appear to be in Lebanon, incl. its chief Fatiha, but some continue to travel between the 2 countries, as the border remains porous. Separately, the 2nd strand of the Security interventions targeted insurgents involved in the 6 March attacks - at least 20 were arrested this year, incl. some members of the Coastal Shield Brigade. The broader 2026 pattern is therefore that Security forces shifted from reacting to a wider insurgent threat toward specifically targeting the remaining active cells & those involved in the 6 March attacks. Men of Light became the main focus because of its IED activity, while other insurgent groups ceased attacks. The situation on the Coast doesn't appear likely to change in the short term, as the strategic balance remains favorable to Damascus. It hence appears likely to follow the trend observed so far in 2026: very few or no attacks, combined with occasional Security raids against remaining cells & participants in the 6 March attacks. --- * Documented IED attacks on the Coast since Summer 2025: - January 10, 2026: IEDs dismantled near the Highway in Baniyas - October 27, 2025: IED destroyed an empty Police vehicle in Tartus - September 29, 2025: IED targeting a military vehicle on Jablah Highway - no casualties - August 14, 2025: military vehicle targeted by an IED on the Highway near Jablah - no casualties * Security operations vs active cells past 12 months: - July 25, 2026: 2 Men of Light & Saraya Kumait commanders killed in Falasqo - July 5, 2026: 7-member cell that killed Alawite individuals accused of collaboration dismantled in the Ghab - February 24, 2026: 3 Men of Light members killed, incl. the overall leader near Hamam Qarahle - January 24, 2026: 3 Men of Light members arrested in various locations in Latakia province (Qerdaha, Haffah & Jablah) - December 24, 2025: 2 Men of Light members killed in Baabda, 1 captured & 1 escaped - November 3, 2025: 3 Azrael Regiment members arrested in Baniyas countryside, 1 killed -> 8 insurgents - incl. 3 commanders - killed & 14 captured in the operations listed above.
- Sep 29, 20262.0x their median
في عملية أمنية استباقية، أحبط جهاز الاستخبارات العامة بالتعاون مع قوى الأمن الداخلي مخططاً تخريبياً في حوض اليرموك بدرعا، وألقى القبض على خلية تابعة لميليشيا حزب الله مؤلفة من ثلاثة أشخاص وهم: (ف.ك)، و(ز.م)، و(ل.ع). وجاءت العملية إثر رصد دقيق لمحاولة الخلية تجهيز منصات إطلاق صواريخ بهدف تنفيذ اعتداءات في مسعى لزعزعة الأمن والاستقرار، وقد جرى تفكيك المنصات بالكامل، فيما تستمر التحقيقات مع الموقوفين تمهيداً لإحالتهم إلى القضاء المختص لينالوا جزاءهم العادل. #وزارة_الداخلية_السورية #قوى_الأمن_الداخلي
- Sep 28, 20261.9x their median
ألقت قوى الأمن الداخلي القبض على المدعو أحمد خليف الأحمد الملقب بـ"العطيش"، الرئيس الأسبق لقسم المعلومات في فرع أمن الدولة بدير الزور إبان عهد النظام البائد، إثر عملية أمنية ومتابعة دقيقة لتحركاته. وأظهرت التحقيقات الأولية أن المذكور احتفظ بمنصبه الأمني لمدة عشرين عاماً، حيث كان يُعد الذراع الأيمن لرئيس الفرع آنذاك، المدعو دعاس دعاس. وبيّنت مجريات التحقيق والسجلات الأمنية تورط الموقوف في الإشراف على عمليات ملاحقة وتدبير تقارير أمنية تسببت في اعتقال العديد من المواطنين، والذين تمت تصفيتهم لاحقاً داخل سجون ومعتقلات النظام البائد. وتستمر التحقيقات مع الموقوف لاستكمال الإجراءات القانونية اللازمة بحقه، تمهيداً لتقديمه إلى القضاء المختص لينال جزاءه العادل. #وزارة_الداخلية_السورية #قوى_الأمن_الداخلي
- Sep 16, 20253.9x their median
#Syria: an instructor on the use of suicide drones was killed today during a training session. Former Ansar Tawheed's drone expert, now part of the 82nd Division, he was from #Idlib-city. https://t.co/GO2Fd2C6ZP
- Sep 25, 20261.8x their median
الإخبارية السورية عن مصدر في مكافحة الإرهاب: إدارة مكافحة الإرهاب تلقي القبض على الطيار المجرم خلدون حسين مبارك #عاجل https://t.co/2a0obatxZ8
Ranked by total interactions across everything we have tracked for this account, which is a longer history than the 30-day window the rates above use. The multiple compares each post to this account's own median.
Recurring topics
The most frequent hashtags in the sampled posts. They describe what this account writes about; they are not a performance signal, and the catalog-wide breakdown on the hub shows how little hashtag count moves.
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Reading these numbers
A typical post picks up 156 interactions against 83K followers, an engagement rate of 0.187%. Measured over 30 original posts, its engagement rate beats 63% of 26,733 tracked accounts of a similar size, which puts it in the middle of its size range rather than at either end. Posts are seen about 14K times each, and 1.10% of those impressions turn into an interaction. That is about 17.0% of the follower count, which is the gap between an audience on paper and an audience in a timeline. Posting runs at about 2.2 posts a day over the last 30 days, though only 40% of days saw any activity at all. Most posts go out around 18:00 UTC, and Monday is the busiest day of the week. Of the 30 posts sampled, 80% carry an image or video and 17% link out. The account's strongest tracked post pulled 1.6K interactions, about 10x its own typical post. Recurring topics include #syria, #isis, #damascus.
- What is Qalaat Al Mudiq's engagement rate on X?
- Qalaat Al Mudiq (@QalaatAlMudiq) has an engagement rate of 0.187%, based on the median interactions across 30 original posts from the last 30 days against 83,466 followers. Replies, reposts and quote-posts of other people are excluded from that sample.
- Is that a good engagement rate?
- At 0.187%, Qalaat Al Mudiq sits above the 50th percentile of the 268,300 accounts in this comparison. Those comparison accounts are all large ones, because our scanning cadence is weighted towards big accounts, so this is a ranking among peers of similar scale rather than a ranking across X.
- Does @QalaatAlMudiq have real engagement?
- Its engagement rate beats 63% of the tracked X accounts closest to it in follower count (26,733 accounts), which puts it in the middle of its size range group. Ranking inside a size band matters because engagement rate falls as accounts grow, so a raw rate would mostly re-measure the follower count. It is a starting point for a look at follower quality, not a verdict on it.
- When does @QalaatAlMudiq post?
- Most posts go out around 18:00 UTC, and Monday is its busiest day, at roughly 2.23 posts per day across the measured window.