Warfare Analysis engagement report
@warfareanalysis - 298K followers on X
Measured over 44 original posts from a 30-day window, last computed on September 19, 2026.
Engagement
A typical post picks up 259 interactions against 298K followers, an engagement rate of 0.088%. Measured over 44 original posts, its engagement rate beats 59% of 15,519 tracked accounts of a similar size, which puts it in the middle of its size range rather than at either end. Posts are seen about 11K times each, and 2.43% of those impressions turn into an interaction. That is about 3.57% of the follower count, which is the gap between an audience on paper and an audience in a timeline. Posting runs at about 3.3 posts a day over the last 30 days, with activity on roughly 53% of days. Most posts go out around 16:00 UTC, and Friday is the busiest day of the week. Of the 44 posts sampled, 82% carry an image or video and 7% link out. The account's strongest tracked post pulled 4.3K interactions, about 17x its own typical post. Recurring topics include #fyf911, #عاجل.
Measured over 44 original posts from a 30-day window, last computed on September 19, 2026. Recurring tags: #fyf911, #عاجل.
Compared with accounts its own size
Warfare Analysis's engagement rate beats 59% of the tracked X accounts closest to it in follower count (15,519 accounts, accounts of similar size (decile 9 of 10)). A percentile is spread evenly by construction, so 50 really is the middle of that group and 90 really is its top tenth.
On engagement per impression rather than per follower it beats 71% of the same group. When those two numbers disagree, the gap is about how far its posts travel rather than how people react to them.
Where this sits in the catalog
At 0.088%, Warfare Analysis sits above the 25th percentile of the 157,233 accounts in this comparison. That places it in the below the median band, which runs 0.022% to 0.128%.
Show the percentile table
| Percentile | Engagement rate |
|---|---|
| 10th percentile | 0.003% |
| 25th percentile | 0.022% |
| 50th percentile | 0.128% |
| 75th percentile | 0.604% |
| 90th percentile | 2.32% |
| 99th percentile | 83.4% |
This ruler is the whole measured catalog, not a size-matched group: it shows where the raw rate falls across every account we can measure, all of which are large. For a like-for-like comparison, read the size-band percentile above instead. See how the bands are built
Posting timing
This account posts most often around 16:00 UTC, and Friday is its busiest day of the week. The bars below are the catalog-wide pattern, with this account's own busiest slot marked. They do not show how this account performs at each hour: we keep one aggregate per account, not one per hour, so that measurement does not exist in our data.
Show engagement by hour posted, utc as a table
| Hour (UTC) | Vs author median | Posts |
|---|---|---|
| 00:00 UTC | -1% | 89K |
| 01:00 UTC | -2% | 90K |
| 02:00 UTC | -3% | 88K |
| 03:00 UTC | -4% | 94K |
| 04:00 UTC | -5% | 76K |
| 05:00 UTC | -4% | 75K |
| 06:00 UTC | -5% | 86K |
| 07:00 UTC | -5% | 93K |
| 08:00 UTC | -4% | 108K |
| 09:00 UTC | -4% | 124K |
| 10:00 UTC | -3% | 129K |
| 11:00 UTC | -3% | 141K |
| 12:00 UTC | -3% | 154K |
| 13:00 UTC | -3% | 167K |
| 14:00 UTC | -4% | 173K |
| 15:00 UTC | -2% | 176K |
| 16:00 UTC | -3% | 171K |
| 17:00 UTC | -3% | 159K |
| 18:00 UTC | -2% | 149K |
| 19:00 UTC | -2% | 141K |
| 20:00 UTC | -1% | 131K |
| 21:00 UTC | 0% | 116K |
| 22:00 UTC | -2% | 100K |
| 23:00 UTC | -1% | 90K |
Show engagement by day of week as a table
| Day | Vs author median | Posts |
|---|---|---|
| Sunday | +5% | 393K |
| Monday | +1% | 483K |
| Tuesday | -2% | 520K |
| Wednesday | -3% | 472K |
| Thursday | -2% | 430K |
| Friday | -3% | 447K |
| Saturday | +2% | 393K |
Formats this account uses
Its own posting mix on the left, and what each of those formats does across every account we track on the right. Only formats where the effect clears our publish test appear here, so an empty row is a format we could not measure rather than one that does nothing.
| Format | This account | Catalog effect | 95% interval | Accounts behind it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Image or video | 82% of posts | +111% | +108% to +115% | 34K |
| Outbound link | 7% of posts | -41% | -42% to -40% | 32K |
| Typical length | - | +15% | +14% to +16% | 32K |
- 82% of this account's sampled posts carry an image or video. Across the catalog, posts with an image or video run 111% above the same accounts' other posts.
- 7% of its posts carry a link off X. Across the catalog, posts with an outbound link run 41% below the same accounts' other posts.
- Its average post runs 622 characters, which falls in the over 280 characters band. Across the catalog, posts over 280 characters run 15% above the same accounts' other posts.
These are catalog-wide differences applied to this account's own posting mix, not a measurement of how each format performs for this account specifically. We keep one median per account, not one per format per account, so the second thing is not something this data can tell you.
Best tweets
- Sep 11, 202617x their median
Why did the Saudi backed forces in Yemen collapse?! The entire citizen population of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain and Oman combined is smaller than the population of Yemen. The combined number of citizens, not foreigners, in these Gulf states is approximately 26–27 million, while the population of Yemen is about 42 million. There has long been a Gulf view that a unified Yemen represents a strategic threat to the demographically small, geographically limited Gulf states. Yemen must either remain under Gulf influence, especially Saudi influence, or be brought under the American umbrella like the Gulf states themselves. What is not acceptable to them is a sovereign Yemen, or a Yemen under the influence of another power outside the American Gulf sphere. After the fall of Abdullah Saleh, Yemen entered a period of political turmoil. Islah gained considerable influence during the post-Saleh transition. Saudi Arabia and the UAE later turned against Islah as part of their broader war against the Arab Spring. Islah eventually lost to the Houthis, who took control of Sanaa in 2014. The Houthis received Iranian support. After getting rid of Islah's control of the capital Sanaa, Saudi Arabia and the UAE created and sponsored many factions in Yemen to fight the Houthis. The factions in southern Yemen, like the Giants Brigades, received Emirati support, while most of the rest, like the Nation's Shield, Yemen Emergency Forces in Saada and al-Jawf, and Hadrami tribal forces, received Saudi funding. Saudi and Emirati support was divided into two main parts: Buying the loyalty of tribal leaders with money, and paying salaries to Yemenis fighting in their factions against the Houthis. It is widely circulated in Yemen that Saudi backed Yemeni fighters are paid around 1000 Saudi riyals per month. Because of the war, blockade and economic collapse, these salaries became a source of income for many Yemenis who joined these factions. Unlike Iran, which provided decisive military aid to its Houthi allies in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE intervened directly and wanted their Yemeni "allies" to follow their instructions, instead of following the Iranian model of providing similar military aid to Yemenis who don't agree with the Houthis and letting Yemenis decide for themselves. The UAE interests later clashed with those of its ally, Saudi Arabia. The UAE, as a tiny state with a citizen population, excluding foreigners, of 1.1 million, sought to revive the North-South conflict Via The STC as perhaps the most achievable goal, so that instead of 1 Yemen, there would be 2 Yemens, North and South. This is not only an Emirati objective, but also an Israeli objective, as similar attempts were seen in Syria through attempts to establish a state for the Kurds and another for the Druze, so that Israel could fight smaller entities if necessary, and so that the UAE could overcome its demographic inferiority complex. However, this objective is not limited to Yemen. Saudi Arabia may be the next target for partition after Yemen, because compared with the other Gulf states and Israel, Saudi Arabia has a larger population and a much larger territory. This accelerated the Saudi-Emirati conflict, which ended with the UAE expelled from Yemen. Back to the title, the reasons for the military failure of the Saudi backed camp in Yemen: Continue Reading in the first comment 👇 1/2
- Sep 4, 20269.2x their median
Wassim A simple Syrian farmer from Hasakah who suffers from a neurological illness, visited Damascus for medical treatment. He wanted to capture his joy over the liberation and victory with a photo in front of the Damascene Sword monument, wearing his traditional qamis The photo spread on TikTok, and a bullying campaign began, mocking his simplicity and his traditional clothing. In response, a widespread solidarity campaign began among Syrians. The Syrian government also responded through the Ministry of Information by putting up a large billboard featuring his photo with the words: “ Son of Hasakah, You brightened Damascus with your presence,” - VIDEO
- Sep 18, 20266.5x their median
⚡️Hamas military wing, Al-Qassam published videos of its fighters: 1- Al-Qassam Brigades: Field commander Ibrahim Abdul Razzaq Abdullah (August 21, 1981 – January 20, 2024) Al-Muqadma Battalion (al-Bureij) - Central Brigade 2-Al-Qassam Brigades: Sniper Murad Abdulsalam Matar (September 15, 1996 – June 16, 2024) Muhammad Abu Shamala “Tal al-Sultan” Battalion - Rafah Brigade 3-Al-Qassam Brigades: Muhammad Abd Rabbo al-Atrash (13/11/2000 - 16/07/2024) Muhammad Abu Shamala “Tal al-Sultan” Battalion - Rafah Brigade. 4- Al-Qassam Brigades: Hussein Diab Abu Jamous (21/03/2000 - 15/07/2024) Muhammad Abu Shamala “Tal al-Sultan” Battalion - Rafah Brigade.
- Sep 1, 20264.6x their median
This is what happened in Gaza today: - Militias affiliated with the Israeli army entered the vicinity of the American Hospital in al-Katiba area of western Gaza City from their positions in “Yellow Zone,” where the Israeli army is stationed. -This was followed by the discovery of an Israeli special forces unit in the vicinity of the American Hospital in al-Katiba area of western Gaza City. -The discovery of the Israeli special forces unit and its affiliated militias, which had infiltrated the area, led to clashes. - Israeli drones then bombed several areas in an attempt to secure the withdrawal of the Israeli unit after it was discovered. - Sources in Gaza hospitals: 6 Palestinians were killed, including 3 children and a woman (Samah al-Arabid), by Israeli army fire in Gaza City and Deir al-Balah. -Israeli Channel 12, citing sources: The head of Hamas’s General Security Service in Gaza was arrested. -A security source in Gaza told Al Jazeera: “We deny that the director of the Internal Security Service in the Gaza Strip was arrested. An Israeli special forces unit kidnapped an officer from the Internal Security Service after bombing his residence and killing his wife.” -Gaza Security told Al-Haris: “This morning, we thwarted a major hostile operation targeting a central leadership figure, while the occupation succeeded in kidnapping a security official who was present at the scene of the operation.” “We succeeded in detecting the hostile force, inflicting losses on it, and seizing equipment and weapons from it. We also captured three collaborators with the occupation who were carrying out support and intelligence-gathering missions.”
- Sep 10, 20263.8x their median
⚡️Gaza sources: 6-year-old Palestinian girl Sarah Hassan Mousa died today of her wounds after she was shot in the head by an Israeli quadcopter drone while inside her displaced family tent a year ago in Asdaa, Khan Younis. https://t.co/QmwjCGffUv
- Sep 2, 20262.9x their median
⚡️West Bank sources: A Palestinian woman embraces an olive tree on her land before Israeli bulldozers uproot it in Arraba, south of Jenin. https://t.co/ULJspuI38D
- Sep 11, 20262.7x their median
⚡️Gaza journalist Mohammad Haniyeh posted two days ago: “Today, we recovered them as decomposed remains. The martyr journalist Doaa Sharaf, my brother’s wife, and their child Obaida were recovered 3 years after their bodies decomposed under the rubble of al-Taj Building, along with 37 martyrs from her family. Only their bones and some of their clothes remained. They were killed in a horrific massacre in which the occupation army dropped dozens of tons of bombs on al-Taj Building area on al-Yarmouk Street in Gaza City. A wound is reopened, as if the moment of the tragedy is before us once again. May Allah strengthen our hearts. These were the weapons Obaida, my nephew, possessed… Tens of tons of bombs rained down on him, his mother, and her family in the al-Taj massacre in the al-Yarmouk neighborhood of Gaza. His baby bottle, a blanket that had embraced his body, and the remains of his toy… we found them alongside his bones after 3 years of decomposition under the rubble. What did Obaida do? And what did more than 500 people from the families of the area, who were wiped out in a single moment, do? This is what Israel did to us… This anguish, pain, and oppression are renewed within us and burn our hearts… O vengeance of the heavens and Lord of the heavens… O Lord, grant us patience for what we cannot bear.”
- Sep 10, 20262.1x their median
⚡️West Bank sources: Last night, the Israeli army “detained” dozens of Palestinians from their homes during its daily raids on cities across the occupied West Bank. Video: One of the Palestinians “detained” by the Israeli army managed to escape from an Israeli army vehicle. https://t.co/Qi4qHqvZvp
- Sep 1, 20262.0x their median
The entire Western bloc’s intelligence services and the intelligence services of their Arab proxy regimes failed to kidnap a Hamas leader in 30% of tiny Gaza. Instead, they bombed the home of an officer in Gaza’s Internal Security, killed his wife, and then kidnapped the injured officer! While withdrawing, they started bombing the area, killing 3 children and wounding many others.
- Sep 19, 20262.0x their median
Today, Israel assassinated the son of Gaza Health Director General Dr. Munir al-Bursh. Basir al-Bursh in drone bombing in Jabalia. This is not the first time Israel has killed one of his children. On December 21, 2023, Israel bombed his home in Jabalia, wounding him and killing his 13-year-old daughter, Jinan.
Ranked by total interactions across everything we have tracked for this account, which is a longer history than the 30-day window the rates above use. The multiple compares each post to this account's own median.
Recurring topics
The most frequent hashtags in the sampled posts. They describe what this account writes about; they are not a performance signal, and the catalog-wide breakdown on the hub shows how little hashtag count moves.
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Reading these numbers
A typical post picks up 259 interactions against 298K followers, an engagement rate of 0.088%. Measured over 44 original posts, its engagement rate beats 59% of 15,519 tracked accounts of a similar size, which puts it in the middle of its size range rather than at either end. Posts are seen about 11K times each, and 2.43% of those impressions turn into an interaction. That is about 3.57% of the follower count, which is the gap between an audience on paper and an audience in a timeline. Posting runs at about 3.3 posts a day over the last 30 days, with activity on roughly 53% of days. Most posts go out around 16:00 UTC, and Friday is the busiest day of the week. Of the 44 posts sampled, 82% carry an image or video and 7% link out. The account's strongest tracked post pulled 4.3K interactions, about 17x its own typical post. Recurring topics include #fyf911, #عاجل.
- What is Warfare Analysis's engagement rate on X?
- Warfare Analysis (@warfareanalysis) has an engagement rate of 0.088%, based on the median interactions across 44 original posts from the last 30 days against 298,184 followers. Replies, reposts and quote-posts of other people are excluded from that sample.
- Is that a good engagement rate?
- At 0.088%, Warfare Analysis sits above the 25th percentile of the 157,233 accounts in this comparison. Those comparison accounts are all large ones, because our scanning cadence is weighted towards big accounts, so this is a ranking among peers of similar scale rather than a ranking across X.
- Does @warfareanalysis have real engagement?
- Its engagement rate beats 59% of the tracked X accounts closest to it in follower count (15,519 accounts), which puts it in the middle of its size range group. Ranking inside a size band matters because engagement rate falls as accounts grow, so a raw rate would mostly re-measure the follower count. It is a starting point for a look at follower quality, not a verdict on it.
- When does @warfareanalysis post?
- Most posts go out around 16:00 UTC, and Friday is its busiest day, at roughly 3.33 posts per day across the measured window.